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Waves of Migration

A New Situation

The disintegration of the USSR will inevitably be followed by a new migratory situation. The changes may be very significant and may have consequences that are important not only for CIS countries but for the entire international community as well. The new migratory trends are characterized by at least three fundamentally important elements: the ouster of the newly arrived population from the social niche that it had recently occupied, emigration from overpopulated regions, and growing emigration beyond the borders of the former Union.

The re-emigration of Russians

The first of these processes affects various groups of the so-called Russian-speaking population but naturally the Russians proper above all. The expansion of Russia's borders, their defense, and the development of new territories several centuries

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Table 1

Increase in the Number of Russians Living Outside Their Republic

Years	Millions of persons	Percent
1959–1969	5.2	31
1970–1978	2.6	12
1979–1988	1.4	6

ago laid the foundation for the spatial expansion of its population. While many peoples took part in the development of Novorossiia, the Transural region, Siberia, the Far East, the steppe area of Kazakhstan, etc., the main role, of course, belonged to the country's largest ethnic group, the Russians.

The migration of Russians to the country's peripheral regions received new, powerful impetus already in our century, during the period of rapid urbanization. Before World War I and during the first Soviet five-year plans, it developed primarily on the territory of Russia and Ukraine. After World War II, it also encompassed the former national hinterlands, whose population was not yet ready for mass migration to the city. There was also an intensive influx of Russians into Latvia and Estonia, where the natural increase in population was low while the living standard was higher than elsewhere. In the 1960s the increase in the number of Russians outside Russia was 2.4 times higher than for the nation as a whole. But the 1970s were marked by new migratory trends. The growth of the Russian population in the various republics slowed down and later virtually ceased. During the 1980s it did not exceed the natural increase in population (see Table 1).

Little by little the migratory processes in the 1960s and 1970s paved the way for the events of the 1980s, when the mass re-emigration of Russians began. The first was Georgia, from which the Russians have been migrating since the 1960s (when the local rural population began actively moving to the city). Moreover, this migration has been taking place at quite a rapid pace: between 1959 and 1988 the republic's Russian population

declined by 18 percent, i.e., emigration far exceeded the natural increase in the Russian population. Next was Azerbaijan, where the out-migration of Russians began at the same time and the Russian population began declining in the 1970s. It declined by 22 percent in the period since 1959. The out-migration of Russians from Central Asia began in the second half of the 1970s.

Between 1979 and 1988 the Russian re-emigration process affected the majority of republics, and in those republics to which migration continued, its rate sharply decelerated. In 1990 Russians migrated only to Ukraine and Belarus, whereas they returned from all other republics.

Thus the re-emigration of Russians is not a new phenomenon but a long-standing trend that points to the natural, objective nature of this process and its deep ties with the peculiarities of the development of the republics. At the same time, this trend is still not so very strong. Even today, as a result of many years of migration from the central part of the country to its periphery, more than 25 million Russians (17.4 percent of the total Russian population in the former USSR) are living outside Russia's borders. Most of them (almost 70 percent) are concentrated in Ukraine and Kazakhstan. The share of Russians in the population is highest in Kazakhstan. It is also very high in Latvia, Estonia, and Kyrgyzstan (see Table 2).

A new phenomenon in recent years has been the evacuation-type of re-emigration of Russians and the appearance among them of refugees from regions of acute ethnic conflict. Thus in April 1992 Russia officially registered 73,500 Russians who were "forced to leave their place of permanent residence" outside its borders. But even when the out-migration of Russians from republics is not dictated by immediate danger connected with direct interethnic clashes and takes place in a relatively calm environment, it also frequently takes on the features of flight. The feeling of danger is more and more forcefully pushing Russians and other "Russian-speaking" people, i.e., people with an essentially Russian culture, out of Central Asia and certain other CIS countries. According to a sampling study conducted by the Russian Federation

Table 2

Number of Russians Outside the Russian Federation (1989)

Republic	Number (thousands of persons)	Percent	Share of Russians in republic's population (%)
Ukraine	11,340	44.9	22.0
Belarus	1,341	5.3	13.2
Moldova	560	2.2	12.9
Lithuania	344	1.4	9.4
Latvia	906	3.6	34.0
Estonia	475	1.9	30.3
Georgia	339	1.4	6.3
Azerbaijan	392	1.5	5.6
Armenia	52	0.2	1.6
Uzbekistan	1,652	6.5	8.3
Kyrgyzstan	917	3.6	21.5
Tajikistan	387	1.5	7.6
Turkmenia	334	1.4	9.5
Kazakhstan	6,226	24.6	37.8
Total	25,265	100.0	

State Committee for Statistics [*Goskomstat*] with the participation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Russia's in-migrants in 1991 were Russians (56 percent), Ukrainians (15 percent), Armenians (4.2 percent), Belarusians (4.2 percent), Tatars (3.2 percent), and Azerbaijanis (2.5 percent).

It is now almost obvious that the exodus of Russians and companion ethnic groups from the former Union republics will continue. This is especially clear in the case of new independent states in which the Russian population is relatively small and dispersed. It is more difficult to forecast events in large regions with a large, quite dense Russian population: eastern Ukraine, northern Kazakhstan, etc. The normal course of events should exclude the mass exodus of Russians from these regions, because this would mean migration on a scale that would be impossible without major political shocks.

Emigration from overpopulated regions

The second important component of the new migratory trends is the increased flow of representatives of indigenous ethnic groups

from "overpopulated" regions. This word is presented in quotation marks because it only very approximately conveys the entire complex of conditions that prompt the population to emigrate. Of course, it includes purely demographic pressure stemming from extremely rapid population growth. But no less important is the persistently archaic branch structure of the economy, the retention of its agrarian character, the insufficient development of nonagricultural types of activity, and its consequent inability to absorb the growing influx of manpower. Nor can we fail to note the lack of development of the body social itself, the weak structurization of society, and its attachment to traditional cultural norms. All this blocks modernization and leads to the rejection of social innovation, to prolonged economic and cultural stagnation. If one also considers the shortage of funds that is still common in such cases, it becomes obvious that to many emigration—permanent or temporary—seems more attractive than living under the conditions of stagnation or the struggle to overcome it.

Emigration, too, is naturally connected with many difficulties, and hence it can be viewed only as one of the possible reactions of the indigenous population to the economic and social tensions that arise in the course of modernization. Initially it looks more natural to search for one's place in modernized sectors of the economy already in existence, which takes the form of competition in the local labor markets. In the republics of the former Union, such competition has been manifested principally in the newly arrived population's being driven out by the indigenous residents, who hold an ever larger share of the jobs. Between 1977 and 1987 in Central Asia, for example, the number of workers of the indigenous nationalities in all republics doubled, whereas the number of workers of other nationalities increased by only 39 percent and decreased by 12 percent in Turkmenia. The share of indigenous nationalities in replenishing the work force was 1.2–1.4 times greater than their share in the republics' population. The labor mobility of the local population that is driven to the cities by agrarian overpopulation is rapidly increasing. There is less and less room for others.

However, driving out "strangers" and "out-of-towners" naturally does not solve all the problems that are generated by overpopulation and that frequently precede or are in parallel with the considerable out-migration of the indigenous population itself. There were many such out-migrations in the former USSR that were entirely peaceful and that went unnoticed. These include the continuing migration of Armenians from Armenia that has already been in progress for two decades and of Moldovans, Kazan Tatars, and peoples of the North Caucasus from their ancestral lands. It became especially noticeable in the period between the 1979 and the 1989 population censuses. Emigration of the indigenous population was primarily focused on Moldova, the Transcaucasus, the North Caucasus, and Central Asia. The Moldovans have been especially active in their migration to all corners of the country. The recipients of the immigrants have for the most part been Russia, Ukraine, and the Baltic republics.

As a result, the number of Moldovans in Russia increased by 69 percent during that period (compared with a mere 10.5 percent increase in their own republic); Georgians and Armenians, by 46 percent (compared with 10.3 and 13.2 percent, respectively, in their own republics); Azerbaijanis, 2.2-fold (compared with 24 percent in their own republic); Uzbeks and Turkmens, 1.8-fold (34); Kyrgyz, 2.9-fold (33); and Tajiks, 2.1-fold (46).

And yet, the scale of migration of the indigenous population from overpopulated or, according to our terminology, "labor-surplus" regions has been significantly less than could have been expected on the basis of purely economic considerations. The reasons for such slowness lie in the very state of society, which has not yet gone through important stages of modernization, and in the low social mobility of its population. Central Asian society is typical in this respect. Even though one now frequently hears about unemployment in Central Asia, it is not unemployment in the "Western" sense. The indigenous population does not have a sufficient number of traditional jobs in agriculture, in trade, etc.; it somehow manages to make ends meet but is not especially willing to agree to work in industrial labor, to which it is not accustomed.

Thus the issue is the low occupational mobility of the indigenous population, which can continue only under conditions of a seminatural economy with undeveloped monetary and market relations having deep traditional roots in the region and perpetuating the existing system. Sooner or later the artificial supports of this archaic economy will fall, and the growth of the territorial and occupational mobility of the population, or at least a significant part of it, will become an economic necessity. Representatives of the indigenous peoples of the Central Asian region—Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kyrgyz, Turkmens, Karakalpaks—will then quickly begin to assimilate the internal labor market. But because it is still quite limited, the present shortage of working hands in industry or construction notwithstanding, they will inevitably also go beyond the borders of their territories.

The large part of this supply will most likely be swallowed up by the economic space of the former USSR because for a number of historical reasons it is nevertheless easier for an Uzbek or Kazakh to adapt to the conditions in Russia or Ukraine than it is to adapt to the conditions of the European labor market. Even here, however, everything will not be all that simple.

Even now, migratory processes have been extremely sensitive to the worsening of the crisis, to the flare up of nationalism, to the disintegration of the Union, to the decline in the living standard. An analysis of the data of the last few years shows that they have become significantly more closed territorially, are more oriented toward "their" republics, the number of directions with intensive ties has been greatly reduced, and the striving for national separateness has sharply intensified. The increase in the population's spatial mobility that has just touched the peoples of Central Asia and attained a relatively high level among peoples of the Transcaucasus, Moldovans, and Kazakhs has been interrupted. International exchange has narrowed. All this leads to increased overpopulation, to the growth of unemployment in Central Asia, and ultimately to increased social tensions.

Rivalry in the labor markets and lawsuits over land lead to nationalism and to clashes on this basis not only with Russians but also among local peoples within each republic, among representatives of the same religion. Examples include conflicts in Osh Province [*oblast'*] between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, between Uzbeks and Turk-Meskhetians in the Fergana Valley, and conflicts in Tajikistan, Dagestan, and Checheno-Ingushetia. Political instability, which usually acquires an ethnic and occasionally an ethnic-religious coloring, is becoming one of the factors that stimulates the flight of different ethnic and religious groups (the Turk-Meskhetians, for example) and at the same time makes emigration to neighboring states perilous.

Russia has up until now remained open to all peoples of the former USSR. It has received migrants from different republics without looking at their ethnic origin. However, isolationist sentiments are also making themselves known here.

Thus, there is a certain contradiction between the trend toward increasing the flow of emigrants who are indigenous inhabitants of overpopulated regions of the CIS that stems from the peculiarities of the present stage of their economic, social, and demographic development and the conditions of realizing this trend within the borders of the CIS in the present economic and political situation. Failure to resolve this contradiction may have various consequences, among which is the possible increased flow of emigration beyond the Commonwealth's borders.

On the threshold of the "fourth emigration"

The evolution of external migrations, unlike internal migrations, all throughout Soviet history has unequivocally been dominated by trends that diverge from the West, which was manifested first and foremost in the nonrecognition of the freedom to emigrate and in rigid restrictions on in-migration.

It cannot be said that the Soviet Union and Russia before it did not experience any emigration whatsoever. Even though the possibility of internal agrarian "colonization" made it possible to avoid the mass transoceanic emigration typical of European countries, prerevolutionary Russia nevertheless did participate

in the great intercontinental migrations at the end of last century and the beginning of the present century. According to some estimates, 4.3 million persons emigrated from Russia between 1861 and 1915, including almost 2.6 million in the first 15 years of the twentieth century. Two-thirds of the emigrants went to the United States (about 80 percent of those who left in the twentieth century).

As regards emigration in the Soviet period, researchers identify three main flows, which are usually called the "first," "second," and "third" emigrations. All three flows were predominantly the result of political factors and substantially differed from the prerevolutionary emigration for economic reasons that was most typical of the modern history of Western countries. The "first" and "second" flows were basically forced emigration "waves" during the periods of World War I, the Civil War, and World War II; the "third" flow was the voluntary, predominantly "ethnic" emigration of recent decades. Of course, such a division is conditional; emigration ebbed and flowed but almost never dried up. The reference is essentially to three peaks of emigration.

According to existing approximate estimates (especially for the two first "waves"), the scale of emigration was as follows: first emigration (1917–38), 4–5.5 million; second emigration (1939–47), 8–10 million; third emigration (1948–90), 1.1 million. As we see, the third, for the first time relatively voluntary, emigration yields significantly to the first two in scale.

We have the official data of the USSR State Committee for Statistics at our disposal starting with 1961. They show that there was a certain influx of population into the USSR during and immediately after the Khrushchev thaw: for the most part, Armenians returning to their historical homeland, refugees from China, and a sharply increased flow of students arriving from Asian and African countries for an extended period of study. There was, of course, a high degree of out-migration, but it was offset by immigration so that the migration balance was positive for the USSR.

The in-migration diminished significantly in subsequent decades. Out-migration was also a weak rivulet limited by strict prohibitions; nevertheless, the migration balance became negative. In the 1970s, net emigration ranged between 10,000 and 15,000 persons, rising to 30,000–40,000 only in individual years. Emigration was still lower in the 1980s.

The turning point came in 1988, when the virtually unrestricted emigration of Jews, Germans, and Greeks and exit visas for visits in response to private invitations were allowed. The population immediately responded to the expansion of this freedom. Emigration from the USSR increased 2.5-fold compared with the preceding year (108,000 against 39,000), once again more than doubled in 1989 (235,000), and again almost doubled in 1990 (452,000). The flow in the opposite direction was weak. A distinguishing feature of the international migratory exchange of the USSR in recent years is its sharply expressed unidirectionality: a rapid increase in emigration, whereas immigration remains negligible. Suffice it to say that according to the data of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, only 2,000 persons a year have arrived to take up permanent residence in our country.

The largest flows of emigrants were to Israel and Germany; there were also substantial flows to Greece and the United States. Most of them (approximately two-thirds) came—almost equally—from Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. There were weighty shares from Belarus (7.5 percent) and Moldova (4.6). Emigrants from the European part of the country are for the most part Jews; emigrants from Kazakhstan and Central Asia are primarily Germans. Sixteen percent of the emigrants in 1990 came from Central Asia.

Emigration from capitals and capital-city provinces is most intensive. In 1989–90, about 40 percent of the emigrants from Russia were residents of Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Leningrad Province; almost half of them were from Moscow. In 1990 Kiev and Odessa Province were the leaders in Ukraine; Gomel' Province and Minsk, in Belarus; and Karaganda Province, Alma-Ata, and Alma-Ata Province, in Kazakhstan.

In spite of the enormous quantitative changes in recent years, qualitatively all this is the same "third emigration" that consists of representatives of several ethnic or religious minorities that aspire to the right of free emigration and that are oriented first of all toward returning to their historical homeland or toward joining a powerful foreign diaspora. Strictly speaking, the "third emigration" was able to acquire a large scale owing to foreign support; this is its distinguishing feature. Its motivations vary: economic, political, ethnocultural, and other considerations are intertwined in them.

Specific "ethnic" factors of the "third emigration" will not lose their role for a certain part of the population of the former USSR even in the future, but their significance will inevitably diminish, while both economic and political factors will be advanced to the forefront. The Law on Leaving and Entering the Country, passed by the USSR Supreme Soviet in May 1991, should take effect on 1 January 1993 in Russia and probably in other CIS countries as well. The law guarantees the observance of international law on the freedom of migration. And this will make possible emigration for economic reasons, to look for work, which was previously inaccessible to all Soviet citizens regardless of their ethnicity. Considering the present state of the Soviet economy and the situation of the general sociopolitical crisis, there is every reason to believe that such emigration can acquire quite a massive character. In other words, many, if not all, independent states that originated on the territory of the USSR are on the threshold of a new, "fourth emigration."

The potential composition of the "fourth wave"

It is possible even now to imagine the potential components of this emigration. Depending on the course of events it may include:

—the continuation of the third, "ethnic emigration" of persons who are not satisfied with their lot (in one or another state–former Union republic) as representatives of certain ethnic or religious minorities;

—a new "ethnic emigration" that will affect some of the country's principal ethnic groups, especially the Russians;

—"economic emigration," both "European" and "Asian"; and

—political and ecological refugees, who may appear in situations of acute political crises or ecological catastrophes.

Continuation of the "third emigration"

Just as soon as the Law on Leaving and Entering the Country takes effect, it will, of course, be extended to include, among others, those who comprise the basis of the "third emigration," which will thus become dissolved in the "fourth."

"Ethnic emigration" is not new to Russia or the other states that presently exist in the European part of the former Union. Prerevolutionary emigration also had a clearly expressed ethnic coloring. For example, of the 2.4 million persons who emigrated to the United States between 1899 and 1913, 41 percent were Jews, 29 percent were Poles, 9 percent were Lithuanians and Latvians, 7 percent were Finns, 6 percent were Germans, and 7 percent were Ukrainians together with Russians and Belorussians. However, the potential of this type of migration—to the extent that we are talking about ethnic minorities that are oriented toward foreign representatives of their ethnic group, which have their own state or a strong diaspora—cannot be very great.

In our estimate, ethnic minorities whose representatives can theoretically be regarded as potential emigrants attracted by analogous ethnic communities existing abroad barely exceeded 8 million persons in 1989. The most numerous among them, according to a population census, were Germans (2.039 million), Jews (1.378 million; including Central Asian, Mountain, and Georgian Jews—1.449 million), Poles (1.126 million), and some Armenians (approximately 1–1.5 million persons), for the most part living outside Armenia. Ethnic minorities that can be classified as being in the same position include 198,000 Karelians and Finns, 439,000 Koreans, 358,000 Greeks, 171,000 Hungarians,

40,000 Persians, 25,000 Czechs and Slovaks, 262,000 Gypsies, and 208,000 Turks.

The four largest groups of potential "ethnic" emigrants (Germans, Jews, Poles, Armenians) presently include approximately 5–5.5 million persons, taking emigration after the census into account. While each of these groups has its own reasons for emigrating, there are also factors that oppose emigration. Many of them have deep roots in the places where they are presently living: they were born there, and in some instances they have already lived there for several generations; they have never been to their historical motherland; they frequently do not know its language; and they do not have permanent ties with it. Moreover, they are by no means always eagerly awaited abroad.

Thus, if one speaks about the continuation of the "third emigration," its real potential is evidently far less than frequently estimated (500,000 persons a year). While this level may be approached in individual years, it is unlikely that it can be sustained for any extended period.

The new "ethnic emigration"

In any case, the "ethnic emigration" of national minorities that are presently leaving most intensively will inevitably diminish by virtue of the reduction of the total number of potential emigrants in the given category. But this does not in any way mean that emigration having an ethnic coloring will in general come to naught. The reverse is more likely the case: it will receive new stimuli connected with changes in the migratory and general political situation in the former Union. There will be a sharp intensification of the trends of "return" migration, the drawing of certain large ethnic groups that have the status of national minorities—Russians in particular—back to their national borders. At present it is difficult to judge the future scale of such a return migration; it depends on many political and economic circumstances. Already today not only is this migration rapidly growing, but, as we have seen, it frequently acquires the character of

forced migration, i.e., essentially gets out of control, sometimes turning migrants into refugees.

Such a turn of events, which would seem to relate to the area of internal migration, may in actual fact also substantially influence external migration and compel refugees and other categories of involuntary migrants [*vynuzhdennye migranty*] to leave the former USSR. The degree of this influence will depend in large measure on the extent to which involuntary migrants are able to resolve their problems in the independent countries to which they go. The potential for admitting and integrating Russians returning to Russia is in particular a very important question. Incidentally, this also applies to certain other ethnic groups that are also seeking asylum in Russia, as the former mother country that bears historical responsibility to them.

For the present, Russia is neither materially nor psychologically prepared to receive a large number of potential Russian re-emigrants, to say nothing of representatives of other peoples. It (like the other independent states) is even having difficulty accommodating military contingents withdrawn from other countries.

The freedom to migrate within the country is still restricted. Moscow and St. Petersburg, most other large cities, and many provincial centers strictly limit the influx of population. The migration process is greatly complicated by the absence of a free market for the purchase and sale of housing. The result is that involuntary Russian migrants, most of whom are skilled workers and residents of republic capitals and large cities, remain for a long time without a roof over their heads and cannot settle in their customary environment in Russia. It is very difficult to obtain land on which to build even in the suburbs. Involuntary migrants and refugees are directed to the remote rural areas from which the local population has migrated. People from large cities obviously have little chance of adapting there. The circumstances thus drive them into a corner, the emergence from which is torturous and fraught with new conflicts already on Russian soil, which is usually the case.

Clearly, if matters continue in this way, many Russians as well

as Ukrainians and Belarusians (like representatives of a number of ethnic minorities that we classify with the "third emigration") who are presently living in the country's former republics will seek the opportunity to leave for a foreign country. This is confirmed by public-opinion soundings. In particular, a poll by G. Vitkovskaia (Center for Human Demography and Ecology) of 945 involuntary migrants showed that 27 percent of them wanted to leave for a foreign country; 42 percent of those desiring to emigrate were highly skilled specialists (they numbered only 26 percent among the total number of respondents), but only 16 percent named the possibility of finding work in their specialty as a condition to their emigration. From the standpoint of comparing the intensiveness of the "third" and "fourth" waves of emigration, it is interesting to note that the desire of Armenian refugees to emigrate is five times stronger than that of Russian refugees.

While the freedom to move within the country and the creation of a housing market may reduce the emigration potential of involuntary "ethnic" migrants, it is hardly realistic to count on its total elimination.

Emigration for economic reasons

"European emigration"

For all the importance of "ethnic emigration," it is unlikely that it will determine the face of the "fourth wave." The economic crisis presently experienced by all republics of the former USSR creates the probability that there will be mass emigration to the West not connected with ethnic origin and in general with the ethnosocial processes that have been discussed up to now. The principal reasons behind the expected "wave" are economic and, to a certain degree, social as well: the possibility of significantly raising one's standard of living, of obtaining better working conditions, of self-realization, etc.

For the aggregate of conditions, all this is attainable first of all for the better-educated strata, for the skilled work force, which

makes the emigration of this specific segment of the population, a "brain drain," most likely. We call it "European" because it will most likely be typical for the European part of the former USSR and for the Asian part of Russia (Siberia and the Far East). The population of these regions is significantly better prepared to adapt to the Western economy and way of life, has higher territorial and occupational mobility, has more modern vocational skills, has higher proficiency in European languages, etc. However, there are factors that force us to exercise a certain degree of caution in our estimates of future emigration from Russia and the European republics. It is important, in particular, that, owing to the completeness of the demographic transition, they are not experiencing the demographic pressure that in the last centuries was always the main prerequisite to mass emigration from Europe in the nineteenth century and from Third World countries in the twentieth.

It is on the whole extremely difficult to estimate the potential scale of "European" economic emigration, all the more so because we have lacked the corresponding experience and have virtually not participated in the international migration of manpower. The first steps are now being taken toward concluding intergovernmental agreements that will make it possible for a predetermined number of former Soviet citizens to go to work in some West European countries for a fixed period of time. However, this will at best involve several tens of thousands of persons, whereas according to certain preliminary estimates, the count can run into the millions. As most experts believe, both in the next five years and beyond, emigrants will predominantly be representatives of unique occupations and people with high and very high skills, which contrasts with the composition of internal migratory flows: here persons in the so-called mass occupations dominate.

Thus, the "European emigration" of manpower will most likely acquire the typical features of a "brain drain" from a poor country that nevertheless has a relatively high cultural and scientific-technical potential (which is already being seen).

"Asian emigration"

The "Asian emigration" may be of a different nature for economic reasons. Its deep-seated causes—agrarian overpopulation, competition in the labor market under the conditions of a high natural increase in population and manpower—as already noted, foster emigration sentiments among part of the indigenous population of overpopulated regions. The most natural focus of emigration for it is Russia and the other former European republics. However, earnings here will long be incomparably lower than in the West. What is more, the adverse consequences of current political processes connected with the disintegration of the USSR may make themselves felt here for a certain time. All this naturally raises interest in emigrating beyond the borders of the former unified territory, especially on the part of Caucasians—not only Armenians, Georgians, and Azerbaijanis but also Avars, Dargins, Chechens, Ossetians, Ingush, and others. These peoples are very mobile, are going through the culminating stage of urbanization, and are actively searching for avenues of employment in cities. As yet the indigenous population of Central Asia is less mobile. It very rarely migrates outside its republic despite its low standard of living and unemployment. The already mentioned agrarian overpopulation and interethnic conflicts may serve as a catalyst of change. Since emigration to the former Soviet republics is now not without peril, [potential emigrants] must look at foreign countries as well.

The desire to live in other countries is quite clearly expressed in various ethnic groups. According to the All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion [*VTsIOM*], which polled Estonians, Latvians, western Ukrainians, Georgians, Azerbaijanis, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Tajiks, and Uzbeks, from 22 percent of the respondents (Kyrgyz) to 45 percent (western Ukrainians) wanted their children to be educated abroad.

However, the real possibility of the population of various regions and representatives of different ethnic groups to find work in the West is not the same. Of course, all peoples have their elite

strata with high professional and skill levels. Thus the "Asian emigration" can have the same character of a "brain drain" as the emigration of skilled manpower from the European part of the country. What is more, it can go not only to the West but, by virtue of its cultural closeness, also to adjacent countries in the Near East, to Turkey, etc. But still, for the majority it acquires the typical features of emigration of unskilled manpower from overpopulated Third World countries. At least four considerations compel us to believe that this type of emigration cannot be significant in the next decade. First, it is hardly possible that the indigenous population will become mobile very soon. Second, the geographical location of Central Asia and Kazakhstan does not promote the formation of stable relations with countries situated beyond Russia's vast expanses. Third, the population of these regions does not have traditional ties with the West that might facilitate entry into the European labor markets. In the near future, the qualifications that have been stated above notwithstanding, it is nevertheless most probable that, if emigration from the indicated regions begins, the labor markets of the former Union republics will be assimilated initially. Fourth, and finally, the structural demands of the Western economy are changing: the demand for unskilled labor is declining, while the demand for skilled labor is growing.

Thus, it is unlikely that Uzbeks or Azerbaijanis will appear in Europe side by side with Algerians or Turks on a massive scale. Nevertheless, the possibility of such emigration to some degree should be borne in mind.

In search of a rational strategy

The real scale and prospects of the "fourth wave" are determined not only by the internal situation in the CIS but also by the situation in those countries and regions that are the destination of potential emigrants.

Since the early 1970s, the European countries have been pursuing a more and more restrictive immigration policy and in

some cases are even encouraging the repatriation of immigrants, without much success, however. These measures are the result of various factors, including the energy crisis and the general economic slump, the restructuring of the economy, the influx of a larger cohort born in the 1950s and 1960s into the work force, the proliferation of communities of foreigners, the increase in interethnic tensions, and the rise of racist sentiments. The increase in the number of foreigners in Western Europe in the last two decades has for the most part not been the result of purposeful manpower recruitment from abroad as was the case after the war but has rather been the result of family migration, in part of illegal labor migration, of the influx of refugees, and of the immigrants' relatively high birth rate.

If we leave aside special cases of ethnic emigration (Jews to Israel, Germans to Germany), immigration from the former USSR now occupies and may in the future occupy only a very limited place in world migratory flows. In any event, anti-immigration sentiments are intensifying in Western Europe under the influence of the events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, although no unequivocal attitude has as yet been developed regarding possible mass immigration from these regions.

A certain restraint toward potential immigration from the former USSR is also seen in the United States.

The emigration of many millions of people from the former USSR is indeed unlikely: there are quite serious limiting factors. At the same time, new political and economic realities can also act in the opposite direction. It is not now entirely clear, for example, how the independence of the republics and their transformation into sovereign states will influence migratory processes. For some of them at least, the euphoria of independence and the rise of national feelings may serve as a counterweight to the action of repellent economic factors. The Baltic states, which have a considerable foreign diaspora, might even encourage some of their countrymen to return to the motherland. However, in the large republics—in Russia and probably in Ukraine as well—the new state-political situation will hardly be able to reduce emigration flows.

What is the general strategic line of the recipient country [*strana v''ezda*] and the source country [*strana vyezda*] under conditions that are as yet quite uncertain?

We have a long-standing ideological tradition of hostility toward emigration. Even though there has been a change in social attitudes and going abroad is now beginning to be perceived more calmly, public opinion is still suspicious to a certain degree. At the same time, the problems that will be encountered not by states (Russia and others) but by the emigrants themselves if their departure assumes mass proportions to any degree are not sufficiently recognized and attract little attention. Such departure also presupposes, in addition to a certain degree of psychological preparedness (and it is not particularly high because of the lack of the corresponding traditions), quite a developed and complex infrastructure. It is already now encountering great difficulties of a purely technical character: rail and air transport and visa, border, and customs services are not coping with the growing flows of people departing abroad.

But there is also a social infrastructure. There is need for a more or less developed network of emigration relations, for a system of capillaries facilitating movement from a familiar to a strange social environment. Such a system forms gradually as the immigrants organize themselves, as friendly associations of people from the same area [*zemliachestva*] and immigrant communes, etc., are created. So far this exists only for the "third emigration." The "fourth," at least in the next few years, will be characterized by the emergence of self-inhibiting forces. Manifestations of these forces may be very painful and dramatic for many, which will inevitably restrict emigration flows.

The prevision of such difficulties even now compels society (Russian, Ukrainian, etc.) to develop a new emigration strategy. There is increasing realization of the fact that it must not be impeded with all manner of prohibitions but rather that the search must be made for ways of transforming the unorganized, "wild" emigration at [the emigrants' own] risk and peril that is the inclination of many former Soviet citizens who do not count on the

state's assistance in something so unseemly (from the standpoint of the ideology of the recent past) into organized and civilized [emigration]. The new strategy in source countries should promote the gradual transformation of the "crisis" emigration of labor power, which everyone so greatly fears today, into "normal" emigration that is temporary to the maximum possible extent, the elimination of all obstacles to out- and in-migration, and the formation of stable flows of one-way and two-way migration. Intergovernmental agreements between countries of emigration and countries of immigration (here, however, it is important that there be a reciprocal strategy of the latter, which has also not yet been developed) are one of the elements of such a strategy.

It is also important to see the reefs that mass emigration may run foul of and the political consequences, including international consequences, that it may engender. Already now in Europe there is concern not only among the official authorities but also among representatives of immigrants from Africa and Asia who fear discrimination in competition with better-trained Russians and other "Europeans" from the former USSR who are culturally closer to the West Europeans. Our emigrants may encounter hostility and find themselves in an even more difficult situation than they were in at home. In the event of serious excesses, there may arise a certain international tension between the country of emigration, which protects the rights of its citizens abroad, and the country of immigration, which does not secure the full measure of observance of these rights.

Nor should we close our eyes to other aspects of the new emigration. Suffice it to recall the reaction of Israel's Arab neighbors to the mass influx of our emigrants to that country and their settlement on land that the Arabs do not consider to be Israeli. Another example is the concern of Western countries over the possible emigration of Soviet specialists in possession of atomic or other military-industrial secrets to such countries as Iraq or Libya.

All this indicates not only the complexity of problems that are generated by possible large-scale emigration from the former

USSR but also the special geopolitical importance of their resolution. It is not enough to examine the very phenomenon of such emigration merely as "economic" or "ethnic." This is also (perhaps above all) a necessary and most important step on the road to changing one of the largest industrial societies on Earth from a closed to an open society.