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Россия и мировая урбанизация: антропокультурная и пространственная динамика

Очерк теории роста человечества

Экологическая политика и гражданское общество (региональный опыт)

Europe's demographic future. Growing Regional Imbalances

Мужчина в меняющемся мире

По страницам журналов «Уровень жизни населения регионов России» и «Человек и труд»

Содержание журнала «Population Bulletin»

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Population Reference Bureau


Volume 63, №. 1, March 2008

Managing Migration: The Global Challenge
by Philip Martin and Gottfried Zurcher

The number of international migrants is at an all-time high. There were 191 million migrants in 2005, which means that 3 percent of the world's people left their country of birth or citizenship for a year or more. The number of international migrants in industrialized countries more than doubled between 1985 and 2005, from almost 55 million to 120 million.

However, most of the world's 6.6 billion people never cross a national border; most live and die near their place of birth. Those who cross national borders usually move to nearby countries, for example, from Mexico to the United States, or from Turkey to Germany. The largest flow of migrants is from less developed to more developed countries (see figures). In 2005, 62 million migrants from developing countries moved to more developed countries, but almost as many migrants (61 million) moved from one developing country to another, such as from Indonesia to Malaysia. Large flows of people also move from one industrialized country to another, from Canada to the United States, for example, and much smaller flows move from more developed to less developed countries, such as people from Japan who work in or retire to Thailand.


Volume 63, №. 2, June 2008

U.S. Labor Force Trends
by Marlene A. Lee and Mark Mather

During the past four decades, baby boomers coming of age and the rise in women's labor force participation increased the size of the U.S. labor force which, in turn, helped fuel economic growth. The aging of baby boomers and the fact that women's labor force participation has already peaked are expected to slow labor force growth in the near future. Many policymakers and business leaders are concerned that as baby boomers retire, labor productivity will drop as more experienced workers are replaced by people with fewer years on the job. But there are also potential benefits for those seeking employment. For example, with a smaller pool of potential workers, employers may provide extra incentives to retain employees or to encourage women, the elderly, or people with disabilities to enter the labor force. Another long-term employment trend since the 1970s has been a shift in employment and population growth away from the Midwest and Northeast toward the South and the West. Regional differences in wages and cost of living; the attraction of natural amenities; and a desire to escape congestion, pollution, and crime in urban areas spurred these changes in the 1980s and 1990s. Another related trend has been the growth of population and jobs in suburbs and a decline in central cities. Demographic trends, with younger populations in the West and South, suggest that these regional trends will continue.

This Population Bulletin examines demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the U.S. civilian labor force and changes since 1950, and relates these trends to demographic and institutional changes and economic restructuring internationally and within the United States.

Some economists argue that technology changes, such as computerization, have tended to complement the work of higher-educated workers while replacing work for midlevel workers and hardly affecting the more manual work of the lowest-paid tier. They propose this as one reason for divergence in wages of the middle class and the highest earners. With the availability of inexpensive computers, demand has risen for the cognitive and interpersonal skills associated with educated professionals and managers. At the same time, demand for routine clerical and analytical skills used in many positions filled by middle-educated white-collar workers has declined. Technology has also reduced demand for routine manual skills used in high-paid manufacturing production jobs, but nonroutine manual skills used in many service jobs such as health aides, security guards, orderlies, cleaners, and food servers have not been affected by computerization. Recent trends in computerization of customer services and billing, as well as new technology that facilitates offshore outsourcing of these services, suggest that technology will continue to eliminate some U.S. jobs.

In a global economy, a country such as the United States is affected not only by its own demographic trends, but also by the trends and policies in other countries. Many U.S. and foreign-owned multinationals are shifting production from high-wage to low-wage countries, with China as one of the primary destinations for jobs. According to one study, companies shifting jobs tend to be large,well-established, publicly held corporations. Manufacturing firms are the main source of exported jobs, but offshore outsourcing of information technology jobs and customer service jobs continues to grow.

Unionized workplaces are disproportionately affected by U.S. production shifts offshore. A study by Bronfenbrenner and Luce in 2004 estimated that 53 percent of jobs shifting out of the United States to Mexico and 34 percent shifting to China were unionized. The loss of union jobs through offshoring means that jobs leaving the United States are more likely to be jobs with full health care and pension plans. In addition to being costly to workers, losing these types of jobs will be costly to some communities as this may result in a declining tax base and greater demands on social services.

Global corporate restructuring and other trends in the U.S. labor market also have the potential to exacerbate wage inequality. Corporate restructuring creates pressure to contain total compensation for many low-wage and mid-level workers but increases returns to managers at the highest levels where compensation may be linked to profits. In addition, the demand for higher-educated workers combined with technology will continue to widen the wage gap between the highly educated and the less skilled.


Volume 63, №. 3, September 2008

World Population Highlights. Key Findings From PRB's 2008 World Population Data Sheet
by Population Reference Bureau staff


Volume 63, №. 4, December 2008

Rethinking Age and Aging
by Warren Sanderson and Sergei Scherbov

According to the United Nations (UN), "Population ageing is unprecedented, without parallel in human history and the twenty-first century will witness even more rapid ageing than did the century just past." In contrast to the growth of interest in and concern about population aging, the concepts used in analyzing it have remained static.

With advances in health and life expectancy, measuring population aging presents a problem to demographers because the meaning of the number of years lived has changed. In western Europe in 1800, for example, less than 25 percent of males would survive to age 60, while today more than 90 percent of them do. A 60-year-old man in western Europe today has around the same remaining life expectancy as a 43-year-old man in 1800. Today, a person who is 60 is considered middle-aged; in 1800, that 60-year-old was elderly. Older people are regularly doing things that were the province of younger people only a few years earlier. Now, 80-year-olds get knee replacements so they can continue hiking. Older people tend to have fewer disabilities than people of the same age in earlier decades, and now there is some evidence that cognitive decline is being postponed as well.

The media have recognized this change. We often read that "40 is the new 30," but this is more than just a pop culture phrase. It is a challenge to demographers to rethink how they measure a population's age and the pace of aging. This Population Bulletin illustrates how to use new measures of population aging that take into account changes in longevity over time and place. None of the usual indicators of aging available adjust for increases in life expectancy. With advances in health and life expectancy, measuring population aging presents a problem to demographers because the meaning of the number of years lived has changed. New measures described in this Population Bulletin take life expectancy differences into account. First, we discuss the surprising history of life expectancy change within the last 150 years. Because of increases in life expectancies, it is misleading to compare those who are chronologically age 40 today with people who were 40 a century ago. Second, we introduce the concept of "prospective age" as a way to compare people who live in periods and places where life expectancies differ. Finally, we build on the concept of prospective age in developing alternative definitions of median age, the elderly population, and old-age dependency ratios.


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ЮНЕСКО - portal.unesco.org (2001), Бюро ЮНЕСКО в Москве - www.unesco.ru (2005)
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